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1. Introduction  
Many relations are not covered by complete contracts.  Although the involved parties 
may prefer a legally binding agreement, it is often too costly to construct a contract which 
fully accounts for the possible contingencies of the relationship.  Absent of such 
contracts, otherwise advantageous trades may be expected to fail as the parties each 
choose their payoff maximizing actions. Fortunately there are many real world examples 
which demonstrate that this need not be the case. In particular there is substantial 
evidence that we instead rely on a set of social contracts, whereby we trust that others 
fulfill their part of a nonbinding agreement and abide by such agreements when others 
trust us to do so. Even when interacting with complete strangers, we often work under the 
assumption that they can be trusted. When traveling we encounter courteous cab drivers, 
waiters, and bell-caps that all believe, despite the one-shot interaction of our relationship, 
that we will reward good service with a good tip. When making one-time purchases, we 
trust that the conditions of delivery will be acceptable.  Or, when selling fruit from an 
unattended road stand, the farmer trusts that customers will pay for the produce.1 By 
trusting and rewarding trust we are able to sustain a society which is superior to what we 
should expect absent substantial contractual agreements. 
 Despite their obvious advantages trust and trustworthy behavior are puzzling 
phenomena. In trusting others self-interested people purposively put themselves in 
situations where other self-interested people can take advantage of them, and when 
rewarding trust we choose costly actions which merely improve the well being of others.  




allows us to sustain a superior society then it may be argued that we have evolved to have 
these traits. Perhaps we are genetically coded to be trusting and trustworthy. The 
substantial degree of heterogeneity in trust both across countries and individuals makes it 
questionable that genetic coding alone can explain these behaviors.2  Perhaps the ability 
to trust and reward trust are behaviors that develop over time. Children may learn from 
the innumerable lectures parents give about whom to trust, when to trust them, how far to 
trust, and how they should respond when someone trusts them. Even if we take the 
skeptical view that these lectures are just talk, it is still possible that children learn from 
the many examples that parents set for their children in exhibiting trusting and 
trustworthy behavior. If these traits are developed over time, then how do they affect our 
behavior? Do we become more or less trusting as we get older? And do the conditions 
under which we trust become more refined with age? To answer these questions this 
chapter investigates trusting behavior among children.  
We focus on trusting behaviors in children in the belief that this will provide 
insight into when and how certain aspects of trust behavior are formed. We report the 
results of an economic experiment that allows us to look at changes in these behaviors 
with the age of both the “truster” and the “trustee,” and we also consider the effects of 
children’s individual characteristics on trusting behavior. Since elements of trust are 
cognitively complex, involving reading and interpreting subtle nuances in the behavior of 
others, and the ability to infer other’s intentions and motivations, we might expect to find 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 This example was first noted by Dawes and Thaler (1988). 
2 For example, Knack and Keever (1997) and Yamagishi in this volume. Note, however, that Buchan et al. 
(1999) find generally similar levels of trust across countries, when using experiments similar to those used 




differences among young children, teenagers, and adults in their responses to trust 
dilemmas. 
This research is part of a new effort to use economic methods and models to 
explore the behavior of children. In Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001) we show that by 
about age 11, children’s consumption choices are generally consistent with rational 
behavior. In Harbaugh, Krause and Vesterlund (2001) we find that even 7-year-old 
children tend to value goods more when they own them than when they don’t. We take 
this as evidence that children exhibit an endowment effect which is similar to that found 
in adults. In more complex economic interactions, we show that bargaining ability among 
children is very well developed at a surprisingly young age. Already at age 7 children 
appear to correctly consider the probability of rejection in bargaining games (Harbaugh, 
Krause, and Liday, 2001). In situations involving choice under risk, we have shown that 
children’s choices are only slightly less consistent across choices than are 
undergraduates’ choices, and we’ve shown that their behavior can be captured by variants 
of the same sorts of subjective expected probability models that are commonly used for 
adults (Harbaugh, Krause and Vesterlund, 2002).  
On the other hand, our investigation into children’s altruism has revealed some 
systematic differences between children’s and adults’ decisions. In one-shot dictator 
games, where one player is asked to decide how much of a pie to give to an anonymous 
other player, the youngest children tend to make considerably smaller transfers than do of 
older children and adults (Harbaugh, Krause and Liday, 2001). We find age differences in 
behavior across rounds in repeated linear public goods games, where individuals in a 




private payoffs for the benefit of the other group members (Harbaugh and Krause, 2000). 
In multiple-round experiments, adults typically contribute less to the public good in the 
later rounds, possibly because they learn to free ride. On average, the six- to twelve-year-
old children in our study actually contributed more to the public good in the later rounds. 
However, the oldest among them behaved more like adults: participants who were 
eleven-and-a-half and older contributed less to the public good in the later rounds of the 
experiment. While the public-good experiments were not designed to investigate trust, 
one plausible explanation for this result is that the younger children came to trust their 
(anonymous) group mates, while the older children realized either the possibility that 
their own trust would be violated, or that they themselves could exploit others’ trust in 
later rounds. This finding may be seen as evidence that trusting and trustworthy behaviors 
develop with age. 
In this chapter we will more carefully examine trust in children. The objective is 
twofold. First we hope to determine whether trust develops with age, and thus whether 
models of evolution are likely to appropriately explain these traits. Second, determining 
the extent to which children exhibit these traits is interesting in and of itself as it will help 
us determine whether the standard perception of these traits in children is correct. Oddly, 
while children are perceived as innocent and too trusting, adults do not generally perceive 
them as being particularly trustworthy.  
 
2. Economics and Trust: Competing explanations 
We will use the trust game devised by Kreps (1989) to examine trust in children. 




game aim to maximize their monetary payoff then the standard subgame perfect 
equilibrium prediction is simply zero passed, zero returned. The initial experimental 
study of the trust game by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) demonstrated the 
inadequacy of this prediction. Their study, as well as the many replications thereof, 
shows that most participants of the game display trust and trustworthiness. There is, 
however, substantial variance in the amounts that trusters allocate to trustees, and it is 
clear that they do not follow a single maximizing strategy.  One possible explanation is 
that trusters are uncertain as to which strategy to use (Koford 2001). This is consistent 
with psychological research that shows that people behave with a degree of randomness 
when facing an uncertain or risky situation (e.g., Herrnstein 1997).  
Observing behavior inconsistent with the selfish equilibrium prediction is not 
unique to the trust game. Many experiments have revealed behaviors that suggest that 
participants are not only concerned for their own monetary payoff but also have a 
preference for the payoffs of others. To capture these behaviors, models of other-
regarding preferences have been developed. These models have traditionally been 
classified as either outcome based or intention based. A common element of outcome-
based models is that players are assumed to care about their own monetary payoff as well 
as their relative share of the total payoff.3 Typically the models assume that individuals 
have an inherent preference for an equal split of the overall payoff, but that there is a 
tradeoff between the participant’s monetary payoff and how this compares to the other 
participants’ payoffs. Thus, holding relative payoffs constant, the individual prefers the 
                                                 
3 Examples of outcome-based models are presented in Lowenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman (1989), 




largest possible monetary payoff, and holding the monetary payoff constant the 
individual prefers a more equal division. 
Intention-based models argue instead that the preference for someone else’s 
payoff depends on the intentions of this individual.4 Individuals may benefit from 
increasing the payoff of someone who is kind, while benefiting from decreasing the 
payoff of someone who is unkind. Hence an intentionally kind act may be rewarded and 
an unkind act punished. Crucial for intention-based models is that they rely on 
individuals attributing intentions to others. To determine whether behavior in the trust 
game is consistent with the outcome- or intention-based models, McCabe et al. (1998) 
examine behaviors in the two simple two-person games shown in Figure 1. They refer to 
these two games as the voluntary and involuntary trust games.  In the voluntary trust 
game, Player 1 can elect to stop the game, yielding payoffs of $20 for each player, or to 
pass control of the game to Player 2. Player 2 can then either take $30, leaving $15 for 
Player 1, or choose a payoff of $25 for each. Despite its one-shot nature this game can be 
seen as measuring trust and trustworthiness because Player 1 in passing control to Player 
2 entrusts Player 2 to determine her final endowment. The involuntary trust game is 
identical to the voluntary one except that Player 1 does not have the option of stopping 
before Player 2 chooses.  
Player 2 faces exactly the same options (and absolute and relative payoffs) in the 
two variations of the trust game. Thus, if outcome-based models are accurate, there 
should be no difference in decisions by Player 2 across treatments. However, if intention-
based models are correct, we should find that Player 2 is more likely to choose the 
                                                 
4 See Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998), Falk and Fischbacher (1998), and Charness and 




cooperative outcome in the voluntary trust game than in the involuntary one. The reason 
is that in the voluntary game Player 1’s decision not to stop the game may be seen as an 
intentionally kind action. Consistent with the intention-based models but not the 
outcome-based ones, McCabe et al. (2000) find that Player 2 is much more likely to 
choose the cooperative outcome in the voluntary game.5 
 
Figure 1: A test for intention-based models 
 
   Voluntary trust game                                        Involuntary trust game 
   
1 (20,20)                               1 
 
 2  (25,25)             2         (25,25) 
         (15,30)                      (15,30) 
 
 
Fishbein and Kaminski (1985) are among the few researchers to investigate the 
development of trust and reciprocity in children using salient payoffs. Their study 
examines how the perceived motivations behind a kind act affect reciprocal altruism in 
children. In these experiments, six, eight and eleven-year-olds participated in same-age, 
same-sex pairs consisting of one confederate and one experiment participant. In some 
rounds one player was given the choice between a competitive move that would harm the 
other child and a cooperative move. In a subset of those rounds the experimenters openly 
instructed the confederate to move in a cooperative fashion. Thus the non-confederate 
participant was aware that a cooperative move was instructed. They compared the 
                                                 




responses of non-confederate participants to this instructed move with responses when 
the confederate child appeared to voluntarily cooperate. The results did not “support the 
view that children’s perceived motivation of the donor influenced … reciprocity.” (p.397) 
This suggests that intention-based models may fail in predicting reciprocal behavior in 
children. Fishbein and Kaminski found no gender effects or age differences. This may be 
due to the limited age range that they examine, or to the confounding factors involved 
when studying same-age and same-sex interactions. 
  
3. Experiment Procedure and Participants 
 Although the experimental protocols were very different, a comparison of 
McCabe et al.’s results with those of Fishbein and Kaminski suggest that children might 
approach trust tasks differently from adults. This suggests that trust or trustworthy 
behavior may develop over time, and thus models of evolution may fail in fully capturing 
these traits. To investigate the possibility that trust develops with age, we tested trust and 
reciprocity behavior in children using a modified version of Berg et al.’s (1995) no-
social-history, one-shot trust game.6 
The decision task posed to the participants was as follows. Each participant was to 
be matched with another anonymous participant. One person in the pair was assigned the 
role of truster and the other the role of trustee. For each decision each participant was 
given an endowment of 4 tokens. There were two stages to the task. At the first stage the 
individual in the role of truster decided how many if any of the four tokens she wanted to 
pass to the trustee in the pair. Every token passed to a trustee tripled in value. At the 




pass back to the truster. Each token sacrificed by the trustee increased the truster’s payoff 
by one token. 
We used the so-called strategy method to elicit the trustee’s actual strategy. That 
is, rather than asking a trustee to respond to the amount actually passed by the truster, we 
did not reveal the amount passed and asked instead that the trustee decide how much she 
would pass if the initial transfer was respectively 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4. We explained that we 
would match these responses with the actual transfer from the truster in their pair and that 
their payoff then would be tabulated.7 
A total of 153 students in the Coquille, Oregon, public schools participated. 
Coquille is a rural logging town with an area population of approximately 10,000 people. 
Because school attendance is close to universal, conducting experiments in schools gives 
us a group of participants that is very representative of the local population as a whole. 
On the other hand, Coquille is less diverse demographically than the country as a whole.  
The experiments were conducted in a total of eight public school classrooms, two each 
from the third, sixth, ninth and twelfth grade.  Children in these classes are typically aged 
8, 11, 14, and 17, respectively. Within each grade, the students in one class were trusters, 
and those in the other class were the trustees.  
One option in designing the experiment was to maintain the approach used in 
experiments where individuals typically are paired with equals (generally college 
students with college students). As we were interested in the general development of trust 
we decided instead to ask each truster to make five separate transfer decisions - one to an 
anonymous trustee in each of the four grades including his or her own, and one with an 
                                                                                                                                                 




adult.8 Similarly the trustee was asked to make five separate transfer decisions with a 
truster from each of the five age groups. Participants were paid for the tokens earned in 
each of the five decisions. The benefit of this approach is that it allows us to make 
comparisons across grades. 
In addition to controlling for the grade of the participants we also included 
controls for a number of other individual characteristics. Experimental work by 
economists has generally been motivated by a desire to find results that are common to 
the experimental participants and to the general population. Relatively little effort has 
been made to explain the variation that has been found in behaviors. The exceptions have 
looked at cross-cultural differences in bargaining, (Roth et al., 1991), differences in 
altruism by gender, (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001) and the potential influence of 
training in economics on cooperative behaviors (Frank et al., 1996). To more carefully 
control for the development of economic behaviors, we have included a larger range of 
individual characteristics than is true in most economic experiments.9  
Table 1 summarizes the individual characteristics of the trusters and trustees of 
this study. “Boy” is an indicator variable equal to one if the participant is a boy. Since 
birth order and height have been identified as statistically significant explanatory 
variables in previous studies of children’s economic behavior we included these measures 
in this study as well. While there is no clear theoretical explanation for their relationship 
to economic behavior, both are closely related to social development and status. “Height” 
is the participant’s height in inches. “Birth Order” denotes the participant’s rank among 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 The strategy method has previously been used in similar experiments on adults. See e.g., Falk et al. 
(forthcoming), Charness et al. (2001). 
8 The adult was a hypothetical player. We matched each participant with the average play of adults in 




his or her siblings, where the oldest siblings in a family are given a value of one. Values 
for this variable range from one to five.  
Also we included a survey measure of trust. After completing the trust experiment 
but before calculating payments, each participant responded to the following question: 
“Overall, can you trust most people?”  Responses to this question were used to test 
consistency between experiment behavior and survey responses. “TrustTaking” is an 
indicator for the participants’ response to the question, and a response of “yes” equals 
one. 
Trusting another person entails the risk of defection. All else equal we may expect 
more risk averse individuals to be less likely to trust. To control for heterogeneity in risk 
attitudes we therefore asked trusters to complete a risk task after completing the trust 
game.10  For this task, each truster was given five tokens and shown a spinner indicating a 
60% chance of doubling the amount staked and a 40% chance of losing the amount 
staked. Trusters were asked to choose how many tokens they wished to stake on the 
spinner and how many they wished to keep.  We use the number of tokens staked on the 
spinner as a measure of preference for risk. 11 The “TrusterRisk” variable is the number 
of tokens that the truster staked in the risk experiment described above. This variable 
ranged from 0 to 5.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 See Buchan and Croson (1999) for references on cross-country and gender differences in the trust game. 
10 Eckel and Wilson (2000) find that for adults, a truster’s attitude towards risk affects her choice of more 
or less risky trust games. 




Table 1: Individual characteristics 
 
 Grade: Boy Height Birthorder SurveyTrust TrusterRisk 
Truster 3rd Grade 0.42 51.7 1.8 0.65 2.27 
 6th Grade 0.55 62.2 2.1 0.55 3.35 
 9th Grade 0.35 65.8 2.6 0.30 3.45 
 12th Grade 0.44 67.3 1.5 0.38 3.06 
 Average 0.44 60.7 2.0 0.49 2.98 
Trustee 3rd Grade 0.29 55.3 2.3 0.67  
 6th Grade 0.48 59.3 2.2 0.71  
 9th Grade 0.87 67.7 2.0 0.47  
 12th Grade 0.73 68.0 1.5 0.36  
 Average 0.54 61.1 2.1 0.59  
 
While we use the terms trustee, truster, and partners in describing the experiment, 
our protocol used the neutral terms of first and second mover and “person you are 
matched with.”  Both types of participants were asked how many tokens they wanted to 
“pass” and the word trust was never used in the protocol.  
The experiments were conducted over a three-day period, with the truster session 
being conducted on the first day and the trustee session on the second day, and finally 
participants were paid on the last day. Third-graders used their accumulated tokens to 
purchase items from our experiment store.  The experiment store stocks toys, school and 
art supplies, and games.   Items are priced so that one token is worth approximately 25 
cents (when compared with prices for similar items at retail stores).  We have found that 




items from the experiment store because children cannot independently go to a retail 
store to convert cash into goods of their own choosing. The experiment store makes the 
payoffs immediate and salient for these children. The children in sixth, ninth, and twelfth 
grade were paid a quarter for each token earned.  
Our protocol differs in five ways from the Berg et al. protocol. First, we use the 
strategy method, rather than showing each trustee the actual decision of the truster with 
whom they are matched. Second, each player is matched with multiple partners (one from 
each grade). Third, our experiment was blind, not double blind, that is while the 
participants could not identify the person with whom they were matched, the 
experimenter could match the decisions to the individual making them. Fourth, the 
trustees could transfer any portion of their endowment and were not restricted to making 
transfers from the amount received from the trusters.12 Finally, all the participants in this 
study had to wait a day or two for their payoffs, instead of receiving them immediately.  




 We begin by considering the decisions of the trusters, and then turn to the 
trustees’ responses.  
                                                 
12 Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund (2002) find that adult trustees make transfers even when they have 






 Table 2 summarizes the average passes from trusters, by grade of the truster and 
grade of the trustee. Similar to the experiments on adults, we find that the game-theoretic 
predictions for selfish preferences are not supported by our data. Average proposals from 
every grade and to every grade are always significantly different from zero. (Using one-
sided t-tests, the highest p-value is 0.002). Of the 410 passing decisions that are made, 
only 112 (27%) were passes of zero tokens. Only five children out of 82 (6%) passed 
zero to every partner.   
 In contrast to the common perception, we do not find that young children are 
more trusting than older ones. In fact third-graders are those who pass the smallest 
number of tokens. On average children make larger transfers to older trustees, and 
conditional on grade it appears as if they are less trusting of members of their own cohort 





Table 2: Mean passes from truster to trustee, by grade of truster and trustee. 
Grade of Trustee 
Grade of 
Truster 
3 6 9 12 Adults Average 























































Note: Maximum possible pass is 4 tokens. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
  
Surprisingly the children and teenagers in this study appear to be less trusting than 
were the adults in the Berg et al. no-history treatment. As shown in Table 3, third-, sixth-, 
and twelfth-graders all passed significantly fewer tokens (in terms of percent of 
endowment) than did the no-history subjects in Berg et al.  Only the ninth-graders passed 
almost the same percentage of tokens as did the adults.13 We do not find monotonic 
changes in passes across ages. Average passes increase with age between third and ninth 
grade, but twelfth-graders, on average, pass approximately the same number of tokens as 
third-graders.  
 
                                                 
13 If we adopt the conservative approach of treating the average proposal from each person as a single 




Table 3: Average percent of endowment passed, by grade of truster. 
 
3rd Graders 6th Graders 9th Graders 12th Graders Berg et al, no history 
27% 30% 47% 28% 52% 
  
 
The differences between our results and those found by Berg et al. may be due to 
differences in our protocol or to the fact that our subject pool is not selected on college 
attendance. The larger transfers to older trustees suggest perhaps that the difference arises 
from the much younger pool of trustees with whom our participants are matched. Future 
work will more carefully examine these possibilities. At the moment we note that, with 
the exception of ninth-graders, there is practically no difference in passes between ages 
eight and 17. This suggests that the degree to which we trust others is relatively 
unaffected by age. To more carefully examine the effect of age and to isolate the effects 
of individual variables on the pass amount, we estimated OLS panel regressions with 
random effects to account for the correlation of proposals across participants. Of course, 
these regressions assume that age and the other continuous variables have linear effects 
on behavior.  
Table 4 provides the coefficients and t-statistics for seven variables and five 
(overlapping) sets of participants.   We estimated separate models for each grade and 
found similar results for the sixth, ninth, and twelfth-graders.  However the results for the 
third-graders were quite different. Therefore we report pooled results for the sixth 
through twelfth-graders, but report results for the third-graders separately. “TrusterAge” 
is the truster’s age in years. “Relative Height” is the truster’s height in inches, divided by 
                                                                                                                                                 




the average height of the class. The variable “Trustee Grade” is the grade of the trustee.14 
This is the only trustee characteristic that we can plausibly include in the analysis of 
truster behavior as all other characteristics were unknown to the truster. 
  
Table 4: Regression results for passes by trusters. 
  














0.018 0.029 0.013 0.01 0.024 Trustee  
Grade (1.46) (1.27) (0.88) (0.51) (1.57) 
0.13 0.75** -0.20 . . Boy (0.75) (3.04) (-0.89) . . 
-0.29* -0.319 -0.38** -0.35 -0.306* Survey  
Trust (-1.81) (-1.38) (-1.98) (-1.18) (-1.79) 
0.01 -0.693** -0.009 -0.037 0.07** TrusterAge (0.50) (-2.62) (-0.25) (-0.78) (2.60) 
0.16** 0.40** 0.10 0.03 0.22** Birth  
Order (2.26) (3.64) (1.21) (0.23) (3.15) 
0.06 -0.03 0.10 0.00 0.04 Risk  
Taking (1.10) (-0.58) (1.37) (0.00) (0.80) 
2.76* 9.38** 2.71 2.04 5.35** Relative 
Height (1.91) (4.24) (1.41) (0.81) (3.04) 
N 82 26 56 36 46 
Note: * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.10;  ** at p ≤ 0.05. Adjusted t-statistics in 
parentheses. 
 
While the positive coefficient on trustee grade confirms that trusters are more 
trusting of older partners, we now see that the effect is not significantly different from 
zero. As expected we also see that more risk-seeking individuals trust more, however the 
                                                                                                                                                 
null. 




effect is not significant. Interestingly male third-graders tend to be more trusting than 
females.15 One possible explanation is that females tend to be more averse to risk. While 
we have attempted to control for differences in risk attitudes, it may be that the risk 
involved in trusting others differs from the risk measure we use. 
Estimated coefficients for birth order and for height suggest that these factors are 
positively correlated with trust behavior. The effects, both in terms of magnitude and 
statistical significance, are particularly pronounced among third-graders and girls. Hardin 
(2001) provides a possible explanation for the significance of the two variables. He 
suggests that learning through experience is one path for the psychological development 
of the propensity or capacity to trust. The more a person experiences positive reciprocity 
to their own cooperative trusting behavior, the more likely they are to cooperate in the 
future. Our results are consistent with this explanation for the development of trust. It is 
likely that in face-to-face interactions taller children are more capable of enforcing 
reciprocity, and therefore experience higher amounts of positive reciprocity. A similar 
explanation is plausible in the case of birth-order effects. Older brothers and sisters may 
be more likely to reciprocate than younger children and thus younger siblings experience 
more instances of positive reciprocity than do older siblings. Obviously the data cannot 
conclusively establish the existence of these mechanisms. However, they are possible 
explanations for systematic correlations and thus warrant further investigation. 
 The negative correlation between the dependent variable and the trust response 
from the survey bears mentioning. Individuals who answered that most people were 
trustworthy passed, on average, one-third of a token less than those who did not answer 
in the affirmative. This effect generally holds across the samples and is statistically 
                                                 




significant among older trusters and girls. This result calls into question the validity of 
survey measures of trust and demonstrates that trust is a matter of context that cannot 
easily be summarized into a single question. This finding is not unique to children. 
Glaeser et al. (1999) found that trustworthiness in experiments, but not the willingness to 
trust, corresponded to participants’ responses to survey questions. Individuals who were 
more trusting in their experiments did not report that they were more trusting in the 
hypothetical survey questions (see also Ahn et al. this volume).   
 Last, we note that the age of the truster has no general effect on the passed 
amount. Among third-graders, age is negatively correlated with pass amounts, and the 
effect is statistically significant.  Among girls, age is positively correlated with pass 
amounts, but the magnitude of the effect is small.  However, for the remaining subgroups 
of participants and the sample as a whole, the estimated coefficients cannot be 
distinguished from zero. The data does not support the notion that the ability to trust 
develops between 3rd and 12th grade. 
  
4.2 Trustees 
Next we turn to the trustee decisions. Table 5 presents the average amount 
returned by the trustees of each grade to the trusters of each grade. As was true of 
behavior for the trusters, trustees do not behave according to the predictions of non-
cooperative game theory with selfish preferences. We test the null hypothesis that 
average returns to each age group equal zero (adjusting for correlated errors across 




observation). In both cases we can reject the null at p-values of 0.0000. Only 3 of the 71 
children return zero tokens for every decision with every partner. 
 
Table 5: Mean passes from trustee to truster, by grade of truster and trustee. 
Grade of Truster 
Grade of 
Trustee 
3 6 9 12 Adults Average 























































Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 While Table 2 did not confirm the general perception that young children are 
more trusting than older ones, Table 5 lends slight support to the notion that younger 
children are less trustworthy. Ignoring the less generous ninth-graders it appears that 
trustworthiness increases with the age of the trustee. One might argue that this suggests 
that the trusters are acting rationally when they pass a slightly larger amount to the older 
and more trustworthy trustees.16 Interestingly it also appears that the amount returned 
                                                 
16 This finding differs from that of Fahr and Irlenbusch (2000). They examine trust games where 
individual’s performance in a walnut-cracking task determines their initial endowments. They find that the 




increases with the age of the truster, however this pattern varies substantially across 
trustee grade. To determine the significance of these age effects we will study them 
further in our econometric analysis.  
 Table 6 summarizes the average amounts returned by grade of the trustee and the 
amount passed by the truster. 
 
Table 6: Average amount returned to truster, by grade of trustee and amount sent. 
 
Tokens Sent by Truster 
Trustee 
Grade 0 1 2 3 4 













































Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
The children in our study did not display the same high levels of reciprocity, or 
sensitivity to the amount sent, as did participants in the studies by Berg et al. (1995) or 
                                                                                                                                                 
when the trustee has earned the higher endowment. Thus the truster tends to send more to trustees who 
subsequently reciprocate less. The individual differences in endowments, however, complicate a direct 




Koford (2001). In those studies trusting behavior was generally rewarded, while in ours it 
is not. The average returns by tokens passed indicate relatively small differences in 
returns across differences in passed amount. For example, looking at the averages across 
all grades, at the bottom of Table 6, we find that an increase in the passed amount from 
zero to one increases the returned amount by only 0.8 tokens, an increase from one to two 
by 0.6 tokens, from two to three by 0.5 tokens, and from three to four tokens, the returned 
amount actually decreases. As a result, trusters who sent zero or one tokens did much 
better than those who were more trusting.  
Neither the outcome-based or intention-based models of fairness explain the 
behavior of the trustees in this game very well. Both models would predict that the 
amount returned would increase consistently as the amount passed increased, either as a 
reaction to increased inequality or in response to a kinder action by the truster. 
One possible reason for the discrepancy is our use of the strategy method to elicit 
trustees’ responses.  The experimental literature has yet to reach a consensus on whether 
using a strategy method results in responses that are different from what we would have 
found had the players responded to the actual choice of their partner. For example, 
Brandts and Charness (1998) investigated differences in responses among adults and 
found no difference between responses to observed action and responses elicited using 
the strategy method.  Others have however found that these methods differ substantially 
(McCabe et al. 2000).  While the strategy method is not hypothetical, it may be less 
salient than actually seeing the choice made by the truster. Indeed it may be that this 




Another explanation, which may be particularly relevant with children, is 
confusion.  They may find it more difficult to understand how the strategy-method 
protocol will be implemented. While our impression was that almost all trustees 
understood the meaning of the decision sheet on which they indicated responses, a 
majority of them behaved “nonmonotonically” at least once. We define monotonic 
trustees as those whose returns to trusters weakly increased with passes from trusters 
within a single grade. Nonmonotonic participants are those who, at least once, stated that 
they would return strictly fewer tokens in response to a higher pass from a truster within a 
single grade.  Table 7 presents responses of monotonic and nonmonotonic trustees 
separately.  This reveals that almost 2/3 of the trustees choose a nonmonotonic response 
at least once. Thus the intention and outcome based models can at best capture a minority 
of the trustees’ choices. The obvious task for future research is to determine whether this 
nonmonotonic pattern is driven by the use of the less salient strategy method, or if it 
should be seen as evidence that children perhaps exhibit a less refined degree of 




Table 7: Comparisons of average returns, monotonic and nonmonotonic trustees      
                      
Amount Returned by Amount Sent Grade and 
Monotonicity N 
% of 
Grade 0 1 2 3 4 
3rd, 
Nonmonotonic 17 71 0.70 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.1 
6th, 
Nonmonotonic 13 62 0.52 1.4 1.9 1.7 0.9 
9th, 
Nonmonotonic 10 67 0.94 1.0 1.3 1.4 0.7 
12th, 
Nonmonotonic 7 64 0.66 1.4 2.1 2.7 2.7 
 
3rd, Monotonic 7 29 1.5 2.2 3.2 4.3 5.0 
6th, Monotonic 8 38 1.1 2.6 3.9 5.2 6.7 
9th, Monotonic 5 33 1.4 2.7 3.0 4.1 4.9 
12th, 
Monotonic 4 36 1.7 2.9 3.5 4.6 4.6 
 
Interestingly, while the average response does not make it worthwhile for the 
truster to increase the tokens passed, we see that the subgroup of monotonic trustees on 
average have responses which make it worthwhile for trusters to increase the number of 
tokens passed. In our econometric analysis we will separately examine trustees with 
monotonic and nonmonotonic responses. 
Table 8 reports the estimated coefficients when using random effects OLS 
regressions to estimate trustee responses. As both the age and the gender of the trustee 





Table 8: Regression results for returns by trustees. 
 
 
Variables All Nonmonotonic Monotonic 
0.03** 0.02 0.06** Truster Grade 
(3.01) (1.43) (3.26) 
-4.74 -0.02 -1.28 Boy 
(-1.04) (-0.07) (-1.31) 
0.68 0.14 1.15 Survey Trust (1.55) (0.40) (1.23) 
0.10 0.05 0.14 Trustee Age (1.33) (0.82) (0.94) 
-1.90 -0.04 -0.01 Number of 
Siblings (-1.27) (-0.40) (-0.02) 
0.05 0.11 0.76 Birth Order (0.18) (0.61) (1.27) 
0.45** 0.15** 1.03** Tokens Passed (15.15) (4.78) (19.25) 
-2.25 -1.28 -0.66 Relative Height (-0.68) (-0.48) (-0.09) 
N 71 47 24 




 Neither relative height nor birth order is significant. This is not inconsistent with 
the learning model presented earlier. An individual who experiences a high level of 
positive reciprocity will not necessarily reciprocate himself. We also note that the 
trustee’s age has no significant effect on the amount passed. Combined with our earlier 
finding that trusters do not place significantly larger trust in older trustees suggests that 
they correctly are anticipating this response. 
As expected, the amount sent is positively correlated with the amount returned. The 




the nonmonotonic pattern, however, we find that on average an increase in the amount 
sent increases the amount returned. The truster’s grade was also positively correlated 
with the trustee’s return. This is possibly a reaction to an inferred higher status of older 
subjects. An analogous result has been found in adults. Glaeser et al. (1999) find that 
adult participants behave more trustworthily towards individuals of higher status. 
Alternatively it may be that children believe that a different set of social standards applies 
for those who are older. Their parents and teachers do not lie to them or cheat them, 
which may not be the case with their peers. Their parents and teachers also actively 
reinforce social norms including reciprocity. Therefore, participants may be hesitant to 
“cheat” adults.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this chapter we examined trusting and trustworthy behavior in children. We 
asked whether our approach to these complex tasks develop with age. We conducted a set 
of experiments with students in third, sixth, ninth and twelfth grade to investigate this 
question. Like adults, the students in our experiment did not follow the game-theoretic 
prediction of passing and returning zero tokens, and we conclude that even the 8-year-old 
children show clear evidence of trusting and trustworthy behavior. In contrast to common 
perception we do not find that the youngest participants are more trusting than older 
cohorts, nor do we find that they are much less trustworthy.  
Across the ages examined in this study we observe surprisingly little variation in 




they are likely to do so when we are very young. This is consistent with what we have 
found in a series of other experiments, including those that involve altruistic preferences. 
Surprisingly the children in our experiment did not pass or return as many tokens 
as adults have in similar experiments.  In addition, children did not vary their return 
amount in response to the passed amount to the extent adults do. It may be that the 
trustees’ behavior resulted from our use of the strategy method rather than age. Future 
work will have to investigate this possibility. 
We found that a number of factors were correlated with participants’ trust 
behavior. Status appears to matter. Trusters tended to pass more tokens to older partners, 
and trustees returned more when paired with an older partner. This effect, however, was 
only significant for trustees. Relative height and birth order were positively related to the 
truster’s pass amount, possibly because taller children and younger siblings have 
experienced higher rates of positive reciprocity.  These effects were largest among the 
youngest participants.   
 Self-reported trust was negatively correlated with the trusters’ pass amount, with a 
small coefficient. It was positively (although insignificantly) correlated with trustees’ 
return decisions, however, and these coefficients were generally large. The significance 
and robustness of this correlation suggests caution in the use of surveys to measure trust 
behavior in children. 
 Overall, we believe this experiment reinforces the argument that the sorts of 
experiments and models that economists are using to investigate and explain the behavior 
of adults can also be used with children, with suitable modifications to ensure salience 




children’s trusting behavior is (broadly) qualitatively comparable to what has been found 
in adults and that individual characteristics matter, particularly among the youngest 
participants. However, we note that data from children is noisier (in both senses of the 
word) than that from adults, and that experiments need to be carefully designed, and 
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